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On December 23, 1986, a Supplementary Extradition Treaty entered
into force that narrowly restricts the application of the political offense
exception as between the United States and the United Kingdom.' This
aspect of the Supplementary Treaty has been hailed as a major improve-
ment in the efforts of democratic nations to fight international terrorism. 2
As a result of amendments by the U.S. Senate, however, the treaty also
makes a substantial change in the well-established "rule of non-inquiry,"
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1. Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with Annex, signed at Washington
on June 25, 1985 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. It supplements and amends the Ex-
tradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter 1972 U.S.-U.K. Treaty]. It was
transmitted by President Reagan to the U.S. Senate under cover of letter dated July 17,
1985. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held several hearings and eventually reported out a resolution of ratification
containing several amendments. S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986) [here-
inafter S. REP. 99-17]. The resolution is reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9120 (daily ed. July
16, 1986). On July 17, 1986, the Senate consented to ratification of the Supplementary Treaty,
subject to the Committee amendments. See 132 CONG. REC. S9273 (daily ed. July 17,1986).
On November 26, 1986, the British House of Commons also approved the Supplementary
Treaty (as amended by the U.S. Senate). The instruments of ratification were exchanged
in London on December 23, 1986, and, pursuant to its terms, the Supplementary Treaty
entered into force.
2. See Editorial, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1985, at A22, col. I ("An important first step has
been taken . . . to seal a legal foxhole that shelters terrorists."); Letter of Submittal from
Secretary of State Schultz to President Reagan, (July 3, 1985), TREATY Doc. No. 8, supra
note 1, at V ("It ... represents a significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation
and counter the threat of international terrorism and other crimes of violence."); accord
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 901 (1986); Address by Sir Michael
Havers to the ABA Section of Int'l Law and Practice (June 30, 1986), reprinted in 21 INT'L
LAW. 185 (1987) [hereinafter Havers].
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a change whose significance is a matter of some doubt. This article de-
scribes how the Supplementary Extradition Treaty is to be applied.
I. Background
Virtually every extradition treaty contains a provision barring extra-
dition for a "political offense" or, in the words of the 1972 U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty, an "offense . . .regarded by the requested Party as
one of a political character.' 3 Many treaties also preclude extradition if
the requesting state is motivated by politics rather than law enforcement
considerations in seeking the return of a fugitive. 4 Under present case
law in the United States, it is within the jurisdiction of the courts to decide
whether the crime for which extradition has been requested is a "political
offense." 5 By contrast, the Secretary of State has sole discretion to de-
termine whether an extradition request should be denied because it is a
subterfuge, and accordingly, courts traditionally have declined to consider
whether the requesting country's motives in seeking extradition are "po-
litical. ' 6 In addition, pursuant to this "rule of non-inquiry," courts will
not inquire into the fairness of a requesting state's procedures, and it is
left to the Secretary of State's discretion to determine whether to deny
extradition on humanitarian grounds, such as a fugitive's claim that he
would not be afforded a fair trial in the country seeking extradition or
that he would face assassination or torture if he were returned to the
requesting country. 7
Recently, a deep concern arose over the potentially crippling effect of
several U.S. judicial decisions on efforts by the United States and other
countries to combat international terrorism. In four cases, U.S. magis-
trates or district judges denied extradition of IRA terrorists on the ground
that their crimes were "political offenses": In re McMullen, In re Mackin,
3. Extradition Treaty, supra note I, art. V(I) (c) (i).
4. E.g., id. art. V(I) (c) (ii) (extradition shall not be granted if: "the person sought proves
that the request for his extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him
for an offense of a political character").
5. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986);
In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 135-37 (2d Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512-18 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 996-97 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
6. See In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 73-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651
(1916); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Gonzalez,
217 F. Supp. 717, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7. See Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983); Es-
cobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980);
Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 1980); Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1976); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. I, slip
op. at 68 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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In re Doherty, and Quinn v. Robinson.8 In each of the IRA cases the test
set forth in the ninteenth century English case of In re Castioni9 was
accepted as the operative definition of a political offense. The court in
Castioni had defined a political offense as a crime which was "incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances." 10 Mechanically applying
the Castioni test, U.S. courts in the four IRA cases concluded that ex-
tradition was prohibited since "political disturbances" were taking place
in Northern Ireland and the bombings and shootings at issue in those
cases were natural "incidents" of those disturbances.
Reacting to these decisions, the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom entered into negotitations and on June 25, 1985,
signed a Supplementary Extradition Treaty that, as between the two coun-
tries, essentially eliminates the political offense exception for acts of vio-
lence and, with it, the traditional role of U.S. courts in that connection.
On July 17, 1985, the Supplementary Extradition Treaty was submitted
to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held extensive hearings on the Treaty be-
tween August and October of 1985.11 Substantial opposition was raised
by Irish-American groups and human rights organizations as well as by
several members of the Senate who questioned the fairness of the British
court system used to try IRA members or who feared that the Supple-
mentary Treaty would establish a precedent that would endanger "free-
dom fighters" in other countries. 12
In the Spring of 1986, efforts were made within the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to reach a compromise that balanced antiterrorism
concerns and the right of due process for individuals. A compromise
resolution of ratification was adopted in June of 1986 by the Committee
and passed by the Senate by a vote of 87-to-10 on July 17, 1986.13 The
principal effect of the compromise was to condition the Senate's consent
to ratification on the acceptance by the Government of the United King-
dom and the executive branch of the United States of an amendment to
the Treaty altering the rule of non-inquiry into the fairness of the re-
questing state's judicial system. The central feature of the Supplementary
8. In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. 1979); In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc.
I (S.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Sprizzo, J.); Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 (RPA) (N.D.
Cal. 1983), rev'd, 783 F.2d. 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986).
9. In re Castioni, [1891) 1 Q.B. 149.
10. Id. at 165.
11. United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 703 (Aug. 1, Sept.
18, and Oct. 22, 1985) [hereinafter S. Hearing 99-703].
12. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
13. 132 CONG. REP. S9273 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
SUMMER 1987
928 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Extradition Treaty-its restriction of the political offense exception-
remained essentially unchanged.
!1. Limitation of the Political Offense Exception
As amended by the Senate, article I of the Supplementary Treaty pro-
vides as follows:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be
regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pur-
suant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person
sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for decision
as to prosecution; 1
4
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily
harm; 1
5
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking
a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter
or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any
person. 16
In addition, article 1(e) provides that an attempt to commit any of the
above offenses or participation as an "accomplice" is likewise excluded
from the political offense exception.17
In its revisions, the Senate deleted references in the Supplementary
Treaty as originally submitted that also excluded crimes involving serious
property damage, possession of weapons with intent to use, and con-
spiracy. From a policy standpoint, this change is minor. 18
14. As noted in the Senate Report, S. REP. 99-17, supra note I, at 6-7, the four conventions
to which article l(a) at present would apply are: (I) Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at the Hague Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; (2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565,
T.I.A.S. No. 7570; (3) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec.
14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; and (4) International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146.
15. The term "voluntary manslaughter" is intended to cover crimes that have been held
by the U.K. courts to be manslaughter and that in many U.S. states would amount to second
degree murder. S. REP. 99-17, supra note I, at 7.
16. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
17. Id. art. l(e).
18. As Senator Pell, the senior Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee,
stated, "[tihe list is not as extensive as the one the administration had proposed, but it
nevertheless covers all typically terrorist acts." 132 CONG. REC. S9149 (daily ed. July 16,
1986). Similarly, Sir Michael Havers, the United Kingdom's Attorney General, recently
stated, as follows: "[t]he list of offenses to which the political exception no longer applies
has emerged [from the Senate] as somewhat shortened. However, the essential ones remain.
The treaty still covers a wide range of terrorist offenses." Havers, supra note 2, at 187.
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It should be noted that the deletion of these possessory and other
offenses from the Supplementary Treaty does not preclude the extradition
of persons charged with such offenses. If, for example, a fugitive were
sought by the United Kingdom for the crime of possession of firearms
with intent-as opposed to an offense involving their use-the individual
could still be extradited under certain conditions. As the Senate Report
makes clear, the accomplice provision of the Supplementary Treaty would
apply if the firearm were ultimately used. 19 Alternatively, even if there
were no actual use that endangered a person, the possessor of a weapon
could be extradited under the terms of the original 1972 treaty, so long
as a court determines that such possession is not a "political offense"
under traditional principles. 20
Two principle reasons were advanced for excluding serious violent
crimes from the political offense exception. These were summarized on
the Senate floor by Senator Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, as follows:
First, in a democracy such as the United Kingdom violence should never be
deemed an acceptable part of the political process. To even permit courts in
the United States to consider political motives as justifying murder or other
violent crimes showed a lack of respect for the democratic process....
Second, to refuse to extradite even a few terrorists undermines U.S. anti-
terrorism policy. That policy is bottomed on the proposition that cooperation
with our democratic allies is an essential element in the war against international
terrorism. For the United States to refuse to extradite suspected terrorists makes
it that much more difficult to enlist the allies in antiterrorism efforts. 21
During the hearings and in the Senate deliberations, some opponents
argued that the Supplementary Treaty ran counter to the United States'
200-year-old tradition of providing a haven for political refugees and free-
dom fighters. Opponents of the treaty sought to draw a distinction between
a "terrorist" and a genuine "rebel". According to these critics, while a
19. The Senate Report states that "an individual accused of helping to construct a bomb,
the use of which endangered a person, would not be able to assert the political offense
exception." S. REP. 99-17, supra note I. Article 1(e) covers "an attempt to commit any of
the foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts
to commit such an offense." Id.
20. For example, possession of firearms and ammunition with intent is a violation of §
14 of the Firearms Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 and is an extraditable offense by virtue of
the U.K. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52 (as amended by the Suppression of
Terrorism Act, 1978, ch. 26). It is one of the crimes within the Schedule of Offenses referred
to in art. III of the original 1972 U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 1; see In re Mackin, 80 Cr.
Misc. 1, slip op. at 3 fn. (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Buchwald, Magis.); it is also an offense in the
United States, see response from Mr. Hannay to questions from Sen. Kerry, S. Hearing
99-703, supra note I1, at 682-83.
For the most recent analysis by a U.S. court of traditional political offense principles,
see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 803-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986).
21. 132 CONG. REC. S9147 (daily ed. July 16,1986).
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few IRA members may have engaged in terrorist acts, the bulk of the
IRA-such as McMullen, Mackin, or Doherty-are merely "rebels," per-
forming warlike acts in the course of a rebellion or uprising. Drawing an
analogy to the American Revolution, these critics argued for the existence
of a "right to rebel" that must be respected in all circumstances. 22 Based
on this theoretical "right," Helms attempted to amend the treaty so as
to continue the applicability of the political offense exception to "acts in
furtherance of an armed uprising, insurrection, or rebellion against the
military authorities of the state in which the accused person is a national." 23
This effort to legitimize political violence directed at military or police
personnel was strongly criticized during the hearings and Senate delib-
erations. 24 A strong voice in this aspect of the debate was the American
22. Comparing the troubles in Northern Ireland to the American Revolution, for example,
Senator Helms stated that:
If this treaty had been in effect in 1776, ... [its] language would have labeled the boys
who fought at Lexington and Concord as terrorists. There is no question that the British
authorities in 1776 would have considered the guerrilla operations of the Americans to
be murder and assault. Their offenses included the use of bombs, grenades, rockets,
firearms, and incendiary devices, endangering persons, as may be demonstrated by ref-
erence to our National Anthem. 132 Cong. Rec. S9161 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); accord
S. REP. 99-17, supra note 1, at 12.
Similarly, Senator Dodd drew attention to a June 16, 1986, editorial in the National Law
Journal, which opposed the treaty on the ground that it was inconsistent with this Country's
revolutionary past, S. Hearing 99-703, supra note 11, at 884, and went on to state that:
"The underlying proposition in this agreement is that all acts of political violence are wanton
crimes and acts of terrorism. It equates all political violence with terrorism, and that is a
bogus proposition. It's as bogus as equating political opposition to sedition or treason." 132
CONG. REC. S9252 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
23. See Amendment No. 2207, introduced by Senator Helms, 132 CONG. REC. S9161
(daily ed. July 16, 1986). A similar amendment had been offered and rejected during business
meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April and June of 1986. See S. REP.
99-17, supra note I, at 3.
24. The inappropriateness of a rule that immunized military attacks by "freedom fighters"
or "rebels" in all situations was highlighted in the remarks of Senator Lugar on the Senate
floor. He stated that: "In Great Britain, we are not talking about a society in revolution or
a society experiencing substantial political violence. We are talking about a remarkable
democracy, a peaceful democracy, a democracy operating under law." 132 CONG. REC.
S9162 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). He further quoted remarks of Prime Minister Thatcher of
Great Britain who said:
There is no justification for the IRA. Everyone in Northern Ireland has the same right
to vote for a Member of Parliament as we have in the rest of the United Kingdom.
Everyone in Northern Ireland has the same civil rights. What they are trying to do is
trying to get something by virtue of fear when the result of the ballot has denied it to
them.
Id. at S9163.
Similarly, Senator Eagleton, a principal draftsman of the Senate's amendments to the
Treaty, emphasized that: "[T]errorism is terrorism. If the killing of 241 U.S. marines in
their barracks, arguably an act of war, is internationally condemned as an act of terrorism,
then IRA bombs that explode throughout Great Britain, killing civilians and military alike,
are acts of terrorism." Id. at S9165.
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Bar Association, which endorsed the Supplementary Treaty as written. 25
In urging ratification, the ABA stated:
Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between armed conflict and dis-
orders falling short of armed conflict in order to prevent making the Govern-
ment's security personnel and property fair game for terrorist attacks in situations
falling short of armed conflict. While ABA policy established with respect to
legislation has called for such a distinction to be made, governments are reluc-
tant to draft treaties dealing with normal law enforcement relationships in a
manner that expressly contemplates such events.
It is the understanding of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice
that, in negotiating and concluding this treaty, the United States and British
governments do not contemplate either country being involved in a non-
international armed conflict, civil war, or insurrection, or governing dependent
territories the population of which no longer desire that relationship. In the light
of this understanding, the Section concludes that ratification of the Treaty is
consistent with ABA policy.26
By a vote of 87-to-9, the Senate decisively rejected the Helms amend-
ment and its ill-advised distinction between civilian victims and military
victims of terrorist attacks. 27 The Senate thus made clear that there is no
open season on soldiers or policemen in countries where the institutions
of democratic governance exist. 2
8
III. Modification of the Rule of Non-Inquiry
During the ratification process, the Senate added a new provision, ar-
ticle 3(a), which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the com-
petent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request
for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account
of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.29
25. Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, Governmental Affairs Group, American Bar
Association, to Senator Richard G. Lugar (April 16,1986), reprinted in S. Hearing 99-703,
supra note 11, at 873.
26. ABA Sec. Int'l L. & Prac., Report to the House of Delegates 4 (1986), reprinted in
21 INT'L LAW. 271 (1987). The report was principally drafted by Prof. Waldemar SoIlf, then-
chairman of the Section's International Criminal Law Committee.
27. 132 CONG. REC. at S9163.
28. Cf. Prepared Statement of Prof. Steven Lubet, S. Hearing 99-703, supra note II, at
394; Hannay, Legislative Reform of U.S. Extradition Statutes: Plugging the Terrorist's
Loophole, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53, 75 (1983).
29. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(a) adapts language found in art. 5 of the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, done Nov. 10, 1976, Europ. T.S.
No. 90, 15 1.L.M. 1272 (1976), reprinted in S. Hearing 99-703, supra note I1, at 570-75,
764-77. See S. REP. 99-17 supra note 1, at 4.
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As explained in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, a com-
promise was reached between the supporters and opponents of the treaty,
and a modification of the rule of non-inquiry was the quid pro quo for
ratification. 30 Article 3 (a) is the heart of that compromise, responding to
the concern expressed by several witnesses at the hearings and by several
Senators over the fairness of the so-called Diplock court system in North-
ern Ireland. 31 Supporters of the Supplmentary Treaty urged that such
concerns were overstated, pointing inter alia to the following statement
of the U.S. District Judge in the Doherty case:
The Court . . . specifically rejects respondent's claim that the Diplock Courts
and the procedures there employed are unfair, and that respondent did not get
a fair trial and cannot get a fair trial in the courts of Northern Ireland. The
Court finds the testimony of the government witnesses as to this issue both
credible and persuasive. The Court concludes that both Unionists and Repub-
licans who commit offenses of a political character can and do receive fair and
impartial justice and that the courts of Northern Ireland will continue to scru-
pulously and courageously discharge their responsibilities in that regard. 32
Article 3(a) contains two distinct concepts: first, the courts may inquire
into whether the requesting state has "trumped up" charges against the
fugitive (referred to as the Ninoy Aquino clause), and, second, the courts
may inquire into whether the fugitive would be unfairly treated at his trial
because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. The purpose
of this article is to avoid unfair discrimination and not to open up a
backdoor for terrorists to escape extradition. 3 3
30. See S. REP. 99-17, supra note 1, at 3-4.
31. See Remarks of Sen. Biden, S. Hearing 99-703, supra note 11, at 29-30; Statement
of David Carliner, id. at 455-56; Remarks of Sen. D'Amato, 132 CONG. REC. S9154 (daily
ed. July 16, 1986) ("[a]nother major reservation I have about this supplementary treaty is
based on my lack of faith in the court system used in Northern Ireland, particularly the
infamous Diplock courts . . . Some say that these are nothing but kangaroo courts");
Remarks of Sen. DeConcini, id. at S9164 ("The judicial system is riddled with juryless
trials, warrantless raids of private homes, and torture-filled prisons. This is the infamous
Diplock system."); Statement of Frank Durkan (Brehon Law Society of New York), S.
Hearing 99-703, supra note 11, at 469-77; Remarks of Sen. Kerry, id. at 241-42; Statement
of Christopher Pyle, id. at 98, 121-25; Statement of Charles E. Rice, id. at 306, 328; Statement
of Joseph Roche (National President, Ancient Order of Hibernians), id. at 343-50.
32. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). An analysis of the Diplock
court, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Department of State
and used during the Committee's deliberations was reprinted at 132 CONG. REC. S9168-71
(daily ed. July 16, 1986), and S. Hearing 99-703, supra note 11, at 549-61. The Department
of State also prepared a comparative analysis of the U.K.'s Emergency Provisions Act for
Northern Ireland, the U.K. Prevention of Terrorism Act, and various martial law provisions
in the Philippines, South Africa, and South Korea. See id. at 692-98.
33. As the Senate Report states: "Nothing in Article 3(a) should be interpreted as to
giving aid or comfort to those who commit terrorist acts of violence in the United King-
dom .... It would be a perversion of the Committee's intent were Article 3(a) used to
impede the extradition of those sought for acts of terrorism." S. REP. 99-17, supra note 1,
at 4.
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Article 3(a) appears to be a substantial change from prior practice. As
explained above, the decision to deny extradition on the ground of political
motivation by the requesting state or humanitarian considerations has
uniformly been recognized as within the exclusive discretion of the ex-
ecutive branch. 34 Recognizing the diplomatic problems that this new form
of judicial inquiry might create, the Foreign Realations Committee urged
caution by the courts stating:
A number of committee members expressed unease at permitting U.S. courts
to entertain an inquiry as sensitive as that contemplated by Article 3(a). This
is particularly the case given the nature of discovery under U.S. law which has
no counterpart in British or European practice. The committee wishes to caution
that sensitive foreign policy issues may be involved even at the discovery stage
and that use of protective orders may be appropriate. 35
In this regard, it should be noted that, except for an appeal under article
3(b), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not generally applicable to
the extradition hearing itself.3
6
In order to avoid frivolous claims being raised under article 3(a) and to
fulfill the salutary purpose of the Supplementary Treaty, article 3(a) places
a substantial burden of proof on the fugitive. The treaty language makes
clear that the court may not speculate as to the likelihood of the prohibited
events occurring, but rather the person sought must prove "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence" that the requested state "in fact" trumped-
up charges or that he "would" be prejudiced or punished by reason of
his race, religion, nationality, or politics. 37
The treaty language also makes clear that the court's inquiry into the
prejudice that the fugitive might encounter is a narrow, focused one. As
34. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
35. S. REP. 99-17, supra note I, at 8.
36. Id.
37. See Remarks of Sen. Eagleton, 132 CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). The
"in fact" language of article 3(a) places an even greater burden of proof on fugitives than
that required of an alien who seeks to avoid deportation under section 243(h) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). The latter statute prohibits de-
portation or return of an alien to a country "if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality .... or political opinion." Id. § 1253(h)(1). In INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984),
the Supreme Court held that an alien must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that
[he] would be subject to persecution" in order to qualify for relief under section 243(h). Id.
429-30. Section 243(h) "does not require witholding [deportation] if the alien 'might' or
could' be subject to persecution." Id. at 422.
The language of article 3(a) of the treaty differs even more markedly from that of section
208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982), under which an alien may be
granted asylum if he has "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality .... or political opinion." Id. § I 101(a)(42). The Supreme Court recently held
that section 208(a) "makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the subjective
mental state of the alien" and is therefore more liberal than the objective showing required
under section 243(h). INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1212-13 (1987).
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Senator Eagleton, who was a principal draftsman of article 3(a), explained
during the Senate debates:
Finally, Mr. President, I would emphasize that Article 3(a) is not intended
to give courts authority generally to critique the abstract fairness of foreign
judicial systems. It is directed at the treatment to which this particular person
will be subjected. And it is directed at the likelihood of prejudice by reason of
race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. A court may not deny extradition
because it concludes that a foreign tribunal does not provide every procedural
safeguard provided by U.S. courts. Rather, the test should be whether the
procedures that would be applied to the requested person, on account of his
race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, would be so unfair as to violate
fundamental notions of due process. 38
It is plain that a fugitive could not carry his burden under article 3(a)
merely by enumerating the differences between the Diplock court system
and the United States Constitution or our own criminal justice system.
The United States has entered into bilateral extradition treaties with
some one hundred countries 39 and has never required our extradition
partners to adhere to every feature of our system. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has held with respect to constitutional prohibitions
against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, that:
[Tihese provisions have no relation to the crimes committed without
thejurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country.
In connection with the above proposition, we are reminded of the
fact that the appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such citi-
38. 132 CoNG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). During the floor debate, Senators
Kerry and Biden appeared to have some disagreement with Senator Eagleton as to the
breadth of the inquiry authorized under art. 3(a). Compare id. at S9164-67 (Sen. Eagleton)
with id. at S9253-58 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (Sen. Kerry) and id. at S9259-62 (Sen. Biden).
Both Senators Kerry and Biden drew attention to a colloquy that took place at a business
meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee and that is set forth in S. REP. 99-17, supra
note I, at 4-5. During that colloquy, Senator Kerry asked and received assurance from
Senator Lugar, the committee chairman and a principal sponsor of the amendment, that a
fugitive "would . . . be able to challenge the fairness of the judicial system to which he
would be returned and thereby raise a right of inquiry into the fairness of that system"
under the second clause of art. 3(a). Id. at 5. During the colloquy, Senator Biden followed
up with a further question about "the nature of the rule of inquiry into the justice system
in Northern Ireland that we are establishing here." He asked and was assured by Senator
Lugar that "the defendant will have an opportunity in the Federal court to introduce evidence
that he or she would personally, because of their race, religion, nationality or political
opinion, not be able to get a fair trial because of the court system or any other aspect of
the judicial system in the requesting country." Id.
The Kerry-Biden-Lugar colloquy is in fact consistent with the remarks of Senator Eagleton
that are quoted in the text. Article 3(a) does not authorize a generalized inquiry into the
"fairness" of the Diplock system, but does permit a fugitive to show that he would be
personally prejudiced or punished because of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinion.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982 & Supp. 111984 & Supp. 11I 1985) (Treaties of Extradition).
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zenship does not.., entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any other
mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose laws
he has violated and from whose justice he has fled. 40
Further, the United States has entered into Status of Forces Agreements
with numerous foreign countries providing for trial of U.S. military per-
sonnel in the foreign countries for violation of foreign laws; yet these
agreements do not contain all of our constitutional requirements. 41
Efforts at defining a minimum international standard of criminal pro-
cedure have proved elusive. Fundamental differences exist between com-
mon law and civil law criminal procedure. Further, there are important
differences among countries within each tradition-for example, between
the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and between
individual civil law countries on the other. As one jurist noted in a case
that raised a question of whether an American citizen had been denied
justice in a Mexican trial, "[i]nternational law insures that a defendant be
judged openly and that he be permitted to defend himself, but in no manner
does it oblige these things to be done in any fixed way, as they are matters
of internal regulation and belong to the sovereignty of States." 42
Even where a multilateral agreement defining trial safeguards has been
drafted, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, a certain
margin or latitude in determining how to accommodate those rights must
be given. 43 It should be noted in this regard that, with the exception of
certain specific incidents of prisoner mistreatment, the European Court
of Human Rights has not found the United Kingdom's criminal justice
40. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901). Similarly, U.S. courts have held that
the absence of a right of confrontation and cross-examination such as that guaranteed by
the sixth amendment did not constitute a defense to extradition. See Gallina v. Fraser, 177
F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960)
(extradition of a person convicted in absentia is not contrary to due process of law); Ex
parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (sixth amendment "did not apply to
persons extradited for trial under treaties with foreign countries whose laws may be entirely
different"); M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 446
(1974) ("[A] trial in absentia is not considered by the United States Supreme Court as
sufficiently extreme a denial of fundamental fairness under universal principles to warrant
denial of extradition").
41. See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, art. VII(9), 4 U.S.T.
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 (a U.S. serviceman is not expressly entitled to a
jury trial, for example). Thousands of U.S. personnel have been tried before the courts of
more than 40 foreign countries pursuant to such agreements. See Williams, An American's
Trial in a Foreign Court: The Role of the Military Trial Observer, 34 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1966).
42. B.E. Chattin (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 282 (United States-Mexican
Claims Commission 1927).
43. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, done, Nov. 4, 1950; entered into force September 3, 1953. Europ. T.S. No. 5. For a
discussion of the need for extending flexibility to states to apply individual rights, see Note,
The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on Human Rights,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 90 (1977).
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system in Northern Ireland to violate its obligations under that
convention. 44
In any event, as the remarks of Senator Eagleton make clear, the focus
of article 3(a) is on whether the individual fugitive would be discriminated
against because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinion in
the requesting country. It should therefore be unnecessary for a U.S.
court to attempt to formulate or identify a minimum international standard
of criminal procedure, because that issue is outside the scope of article
3(a).
IV. Other Procedural Issues
The Supplementary Treaty contains several interesting procedural pro-
visions that raise a question as to whether they constitute a change in
existing law. For example, article 2 sets forth a number of rules to guide
the court in making the extradition determination, including a definition
of "probable cause." The Senate Report states that article 2 is a "distil-
lation of settled law" and is "designed to lay to rest any assumption that
extradition under this Supplementary Treaty will be 'automatic' or that
Federal magistrates and judges will not carefully evaluate the evidence
presented in support of extradition." 45 Article 2 thus would appear to
make no changes in basic procedure.
Article 3(b), which applies only to the United States, limits the scope
of article 3(a) and gives to the government the right to appeal a finding
under article 3(a). Carrying through the specific compromise reflected in
the legislative history, the rule of non-inquiry is abrogated only to the
extent that extradition is sought for the types of terrorist crimes listed in
article 1. Thus, if a fugitive is wanted for extradition to the United King-
dom for fraud, drug smuggling, or some other offense not listed in article
1, that individual may not envoke article 3(a) before a U.S. judge. Further,
to avoid any negative impact on the extradition process from the creation
of the article 3(a) judicial inquiry, the treaty permits the government to
appeal from an adverse decision in that regard. The traditional rule is that
the United States may not appeal an adverse ruling in an extradition
proceeding. 46
Finally, the Supplementary Treaty is expressly made retroactive. Ar-
ticle 5 specifies that it "shall apply to any offense committed before or
after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force. . . ." This article of
44. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
45. S. REP. 99-17, supra note I, at 5-7.
46. See in re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
VOL. 21, NO. 3
COMMITTEE REPORT 937
the Treaty survived an attempt on the Senate floor to delete it. 47 In accord
with this provision, Peter McMullen, one of the IRA terrorists whose
extradition had previously been denied, was recently rearrested at the
time the Supplementary Treaty entered into force. 48
V. Conclusion
The Supplementary Treaty's restriction of the political offense excep-
tion represents a substantial improvement in the ability of the United
States and the United Kingdom to fight the rising tide of international
political violence and is a good model for similar treaties with other de-
mocracies. 49 On the other hand, the treaty's "rule of non-inquiry" is
more a reflection of political compromise in the Senate than a useful
contribution to international human rights. Nevertheless, article 3(a)
should, if interpreted properly, present no serious impediments to the
extradition process.
47. See Amendment No. 2206, 132 CONG. REC. S9153 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (Sen.
D'Amato). The proponents of the amendment-which would have deleted the retroactivity
provision-were apparently under the misapprehension that the Supplementary Treaty would
constitute some form of an ex post facto law. In fact, as explained by Senator Lugar in
opposing the amendment, the Supreme Court directly ruled on this issue long ago and made
clear that an extradition raised no such constitutional issue. 132 CONG. REC. S9156 (daily
ed. July 16, 1986) (citing Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922)). As further explained in
correspondence from the Department of State, numerous United States treaties contain
such retroactivity provisions. See Letter of Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Advisor (June
23, 1986), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S9158 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
48. United Press International news story (Dec. 24, 1986).
49. While the Senate's resolution of ratification declares that "nothing in the Supple-
mentary Treaty ... shall be considered a precedent by the executive branch or the Senate
for other treaties," S. REP. 99-17, supra note I, at 10, the U.S. Government has already
negotiated two other similar supplementary treaties. On October 21, 1986, the United States
and West Germany signed such a treaty, and on March 17,1987, a similar one was concluded
with Belgium.
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